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1. Introduction 
In April and May of 2004, Robert Gray ("Gray") negotiated with Ray Allard ("Allard"), 
Gary Peterson, and Kathy Peterson (the "Tri-Way Parties"), the owners of Tri-Way Construction 
Services Inc. ("Tri-Way"). During those negotiations, the Tri-Way Parties represented to Gray 
that he would be paid a small monthly salary and, at the end of the calendar year, 50% of net 
profits, before taxes, for the work he brought to Tri-Way. Based on that representation, Gray 
began working at Tri-Way in June of 2004. Within a few months, Gray generated gross 
revenues in excess of $1.2 million and profits of approximately $275,000 for Tri-Way. 
During those initial months, the parties worked on finalizing a comprehensive written 
employment agreement but were not able to get one signed. 
Months after Gray began working at Tri-Way, Gary Peterson indicated that Tri-Way was 
not going to live up to the existing agreement to pay 50% of net profits before taxes. For a 
period of time, Gray and Gary Peterson discussed modifications to the profit sharing agreement. 
But when it became clear to Gray that Tri-Way was simply refusing to live up to the agreement 
and was seeking to renegotiate better terms, Gray left Tri-Way. After Gray left, Tri-Way 
offered, and then retracted, a payment of $60,000 to Gray for the value of his services. The 
offered and then retracted $60,000 was considerably less than the 50% net profits that Gray was 
entitled to under the profit sharing agreement. 
Here, the Court erred when granting summary judgment. First, there is evidence in the 
record that the Tri-Way Parties agreed to the profit sharing. Second, there is evidence in the 
record relating to the value of Gray's services and the benefits to the Tri-Way Parties which 
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would be unjust to retain. As a result, Gray's quantun~ meriut claim and unjust enrichment claim 
are proper. Third, there is evidence in the record to support Gray's justifiable reliance on Tri- 
Way's promises of profit sharing. Fourth, the record contains facts which support the existence 
of the type of relationship that gives rise to a constructive fraud claim. 
A. Gray Has Produced Sufficient Evidence To Support His Claim 
In Respondents Brief, the Tri-Way Parties wrongly assert that certain facts are 
undisputed. In contrast to those assertions, Gray has introduced evidence regarding 
representations by the Tri-Way Parties regarding the profit sharing agreement. For example, 
Gray has introduced evidence supporting the following facts: 
After several months of negotiations, in late April or early May of 2004, Gray, 
Allard, and Gary Peterson agreed upon the terms of Gray's compensation. 
(Exhibit 2, Ex. A (76:4-15; 81:4-24; 93:7-96:16; 179:19-180:6); Exhibit 4 1/1/ 13, 
14, 181.) 
On May 21, 2004, Gray met Allard, Gary Peterson and Kathy Peterson to confinn 
the terns of Gray's employment and to sign necessary paperwork relating to his 
employment ("May 21 Meeting"). The Tri-Way Parties again represented and 
reconfirmed Gray would be paid 50% of net profits before taxes. (Exhibit 4, (tjf/ 
11-15) Exhibit 2, Ex. A (84:24-86:9; 86: 1-12; 98:14-99:23; 100:25-104: 11; 
106:l-11; 187:19-188:7; 216:25-217:18)) 
After starting up the Arizona Division of Tri-Way in June of 2004, Gray obtained 
and managed two significant projects which promptly generated $1.2 million in 
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revenue and more than $275,000 in net profits. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (62 ;lo-63 ;7; 
8 1 :5-11; 286: 14-23); Exhibit 8, Ex. F (Deposition Ex. 2 to Kathy Peterson)). 
In September of 2004, three months into Gray's employment, Gary Peterson, 
acting on behalf of Tri-Way, sought to modify the agreed terms of Gray's profit 
sharing. Peterson's proposed modification called for Gray's share to be 
calculated after taxes and called for a portion of Gray's share to stay with 
Tri-Way as retained earnings. (See e.g., Exhibit 2, Ex. A (86:l-12; 124:12- 
126:24; 216:l-3; 216:lS-217:18; 229:9-231:l; Exhibit 4 (7 16)). After a period of 
discussion and after an attempt by Gray to buy out the Petersons' share of 
Tri-Way, Gray left Tri-Way in October of 2004. (Id.) 
After Gray's departure, Tri-Way initially offered, but then withdrew, a $60,000 
payment to Gray. The $60,000 was described by Tri-Way as a fair assessment of 
Gray's value to the company during his tenure at Tri-Way. See Respondents' 
Brief 
11. Argument 
A. The District Court Failed To Construe Facts Relating To The Profit Sharing 
Agreement In Gray's Favor 
All controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the summary 
judgment. Tusch Enterprises v. Cojn, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). Whether a 
sufficient meeting of minds has occurred to form a contract is an issue of fact to he decided by 
the jury. See Johnson v. Allied Stores Covp., 106 Idaho 363, 368, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984); 
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G&hf Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., I 1  9 Idaho 514, 808, P.2d 85 l (1 991) (recognizing that 
"[wlhen the issue of a contract is in issue and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than 
one inference, it is for the july to decide whether a contract in fact exists," and that "[tlhe 
determination of the existence of a sufficient meeting of the minds to form a contract is a 
question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts") (internal citations omitted). Further, the 
law does not impose a standard of absolute certainty relative to every detail of a contract before 
the contract will be enforced. Instead, the standard for enforceability is one of reasonable 
certainty. Genuine Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co.; 132 Idaho 849, 979 P.2d 1207, 1215 
(1999). 
Here, the Court disregarded evidence that the Tri-Way Parties represented to Gray that he 
would receive 50% of the net profits from the Arizona Division. Further, the District Court 
wrongly construed the facts against Gray. 
1. Gray Introduced Evidence That There Was An Agreement As To The 
50% Profit Sharing 
As explained in greater detail in Appellant's opening brief, evidence indicates that Allard, 
Gary Peterson, and Kathy Peterson (1) represented to Gray that he would receive 50% of the net 
profits from projects that he managed and (2) Gary Peterson, Allard, and Kathy Peterson acted in 
a manner that indicated that they agreed that Gray was to receive 50% of the net profits. (See, 
e.g., Ex. 4 (717 12, 13, 14, and 18) '; see also Statement of Facts ("SOP) pp. 6-9.) For example, 
I Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R"). An "Exhibit" is a document identified in the Certificate of Exhibits at R 179- 
180. "Ex." refers to anexhibit attached to an "Exhibit" identified in the Certificate of Exhibits. 
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in an Affidavit filed on August 3, 2006, Gray declared, "[dluring discussions, including but not 
limited to discussions taking place in March of 2004, on or about April 17, 2004, on or about 
June 9, 2004, and in subsequent phone conversations, Tri-Way, through Ray Allard, Kathy 
Peterson, and Gary Peterson, represented that I would receive 50% of certain profits . . ." (Ex. 4 
( 8 )  Likewise, Gray repeatedly testified during his deposition and in affidavits that 
representations were made to him that he would be paid 50% of the net profits. (SOF pp. 6-10) 
The District Court failed to consider this evidence. Without any explanation, the District 
Court ollly referenced two paragraphs of Gray's Affidavit dated August 30, 2006 in its written 
ruling. (R at 83). In short, the District Court failed to consider other evidence in the record, 
including Gray's deposition testimony, that Allard, Gary Peterson, and Kathy Peterson 
affirmatively represented to Gray that they agreed that he would receive 50% of net profits 
before taxes. 
2. The District Court Wrongly Construed Renegotiation Efforts By 
Tri-Way And Language From An October 2004 Ernail Against Gray. 
The District Court improperly construed facts and made inferences in favor of the 
Tri-Way Parties. (R 86-87.) For example, Gray's October 26,2004 email to Peterson should not 
be construed an admission that there was never an agreement to pay Gray 50% of the net profits. 
(Id.) Rather, when construed in a light favorable to Gray, the email reflects the fact that Gray 
was not going to negotiate with Peterson as had been suggested by Allard-Gray's position was 
that the terms simply needed to be applied. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (278:3-19)) ("Gary had the money 
in his pocket and negotiation wasn't going to help the situation. Either Gary was going to be fair 
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with me or he wasn't"); (R at 11 1-2). Likewise, the District Court improperly construes 
discussions related to Tri-Way's failure to honor the profit sharing agreement. The fact that, 
months after he was working for Tri-Way, Gray initially participated in discussions related to 
Tri-Way's effort to modify the profit sharing agreement, does not provide a proper basis to rule 
as a matter of law that there was never any agreement regarding profit sharing. 
Had the District Court considered the evidence regarding the Tri-Way Parties direct 
representations of acceptance and had the District Court not improperly construed the facts 
against Gray, the District Court would have found that there was an issue of fact as to whether 
the parties agreed to the 50% profit sharing. Based on this error, the District Court wrongly 
dismissed Gray's claims. In turn, the dismissal of the breach of those claims should be 
overturned. 
B. The District Court Improperly Construed Case Law. 
The District Court wrongly relied on Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. 
Louisiana Pacijc Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 31 P.3d-921 (2001) for the proposition that the 
agreements reached between Gray and the Tri-Way Parties did not constitute a meeting of minds. 
(R 91). The Intermountain Forest Management case does apply here. Contrary to the facts in 
the Intermountain Forest Management case, the evidence in this case supports Gray's claim that 
the parties did reach an agreement as to the profit sharing. Moreover, evidence in this case, 
including part performance, supports the conclusion that the parties intended to be bound by the 
profit sharing terms regardless of whether or not they could reach consensus on other issues. 
Unlike the plaintiff in the Intermountain case, Gray had no reason to question whether Gary 
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Peterson and Allard had the authority to contract with him on behalf of themselves and Tri-Way. 
Indeed, based upon Gray's understanding that an enforceable agreement had been reached, Gray 
left Albertsons and joined Tri-Way. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (93:7-13); (Exhibit 4 (11 12, 14, 19)). 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Gray, there is sufficient evidence that the parties intended 
to be bound by the promised compensation terms prior to memorializing a comprehensive 
employment agreement. See (Exhibit 2, Ex. C (123:17-23); Exhibit 2, Ex. A (108:6-15)). 
Adding further supporl, each of the draft agreements prepared after June 1, 2004, was written to 
apply retroactively to when Gray started working on June 1, 2004. (Exhibit 2, Ex. A (Gray 
Depos. Ex. 8, 9)). 
C.  The Statute Of Frauds Does Not Bar Enforcement Of The Agreement To Pay 
50% Of Profits At End Of Calendar Year. 
1. Statute of Frauds Does Not Apply. 
By its express terms, I.C. § 9-505 does not apply to contracts that can be completed 
within one year. In this case, Gray is seeking to enforce an oral agreement that the net profits 
would be paid to Gray on a calendar year basis, which given that Gray was starting his 
employment in June would necessarily have meant that the net profits would have been 
distributed within a year. Throughout the litigation and on the record, Gray made clear that he is 
only seeking to recover under the agreed upon bonus structure for profits that he brought to 
Tri-Way. In short, Gray should be entitled to pursue his breach of contract claim for his share of 
the $1.2 million that he brought to Tri-Way as the conditions of Gray's profit share bonus were 
to be completed within one year. 
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2. Even If the Statute of Frauds Applied, Equitable Estoppel Bars 
Application of the Statute of Frauds 
Even if the statute of frauds did apply to the case at hand, Idaho Courts recognize that, in 
cases in which there has been part performance, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may bar the 
statute of frauds defense. Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53,480 P.2d 896, 899 (1971); Frantz 
v. Parke, 11 1 Idaho 1005, 1007-8,729 P.2d 1068, 1070-1 (Ct. App 1986). 
In the case at hand, there has been part performance by both Gray and Tri-Way. Here the 
contract at issue is the agreement for Gray's employment. Pursuant to Gray's employment 
agreement, he relocated to Phoenix, brought $1.2 million in net revenue to Tri-Way, and took 
actions to establish Tri-Way's Phoenix division. Tri-Way performed pursuant Gray's 
employment contract. Tri-Way paid Gray's relocation expenses. Tri-Way paid Gray the agreed 
upon base salary. Tri-Way calculated the profits for the Phoenix division separately. Tri-Way 
even tried to pay Gray a bonus (albeit one that was substantially less than what he was entitled to 
under the agreement). Also; in line with Gray's evidence relating to the agreed upon 
compensation arrangement, the Tri-Way Parties admit that Gray was to get an increase in his 
base pay after one year. 
3. The Statute Of Frauds Is Not Plead As An Affirmative Defense And 
Was Not Raised By Tri-Way In Its Summary Judgment 
Tri-Way admits that it did not plead the statue of frauds as an affirmative defense and did 
not raise it in the motion for summary judgment. (R at 71) Gray objected to the District Courts 
application of the statute of frauds. (Id.) In turn, it is improper for the statute of frauds to be 
applied here, 
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D. Sufficient Evidence Was Introduced Supporting The Quantum Meriut Claim 
The measure of recovery in a quantum meriut claim is the reasonable value of the 
services rendered or of goods received, regardless of whether the defendant was enriched. 
Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 434-435, 64 P.3d 959, 963-964 (Ct. App. 2002); Barry v. PaciJic 
West Consi., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (Idaho 2004); Bakker v. Thunder Spring- 
Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 191, 108 P.3d 332, 338 (2005). Any evidence tending to show 
thc reasonable value of services is generally admissible. See Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 
551 P.2d 610, 616 (1976) (finding evidence of costs is relevant); 66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution and 
Implied Contracts, 5 89 at 1031 (1973)). In short, "[tlhe majority rule in quantum meriut 
recovery is that absent an agreement fixing compensation, any evidence tending to show the 
reasonable value of services is generally admissible." Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Tundra 
Tours, 719 P.2d 1020, 1029 (Alaska 1986) (citing Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 551 P.2d 
610,616 (1976) and 77 Am Jur. 2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, 5 89 at 103 1 (1 973)). 
In ihe face of evidence that was presented, the District Court wrongly asserted that there 
was "no evidence that the customary rate of pay for his work in the community at the time the 
work was performed included such a bonus." (R 115). First, the District Court applied the rule 
too narrowly. There is no requirement under the case law interpreting quantum meriut that 
mandates that there must be evidence that Gray needed to establish that "bonus" of the type he 
sought to establish was a requirement of a quantum meriut claim. A plaintiff need only present 
evidence which tends to show the reasonable value of the services. Second, even if one were to 
apply the standard created by the District Court, there was evidence in record. Defendants 
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testified that they always thought Gray was to get a bonus, they negotiated terms of a bonus, and 
they "offered" him a bonus, and the value of Gray's services generated substantial net profits. 
All of this is admissible evidence which the District Court failed to acknowledge. 
1. Gray Introduced Evidence Indicating the Value of His Services 
Evidence of the value of Gray's services can be found with reference to the benefit 
achieved by Tri-Way. Here, Tri-Way obtained hundreds of thousands of dollars in net profits in 
a few months owing to Gray's efforts. Evidence as to a parties enrichment is sufficient to create 
an issue of fact as to the value of Gray's services. See, Peavey, 97 Idaho 655, 661 P.2d at 616. 
Also, the Tri-Way Parties' actions create factual issues as to the value of Gray's services. For 
example, Tri-Way testified that it always intended to share profits with Gray. The only dispute 
was regarding the formula to be used. Moreover, Tri-Way went so far as to offer (and then not 
pay) a $60,000 bonus to Gray. (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (237:20-238:3)), The offered but retracted 
$60,000 was, according to Gary Peterson, Tri-Way's effort to "make a fair assessment of the 
value and offered [Gray] that as a bonus for the two projects he ran." ( Id )  As the Tri-Way 
Parties concede, they "endeavored to provide plaintiff with a reasonable value for services, in 
addition to the salary he had agreed to accept." (Respondents Brief at 30.) There is evidence in 
the record that Gray previously earned more than $100,000 plus bonus and benefits in his 
previous position. Also, the record indicates that employees filing lesser functions within Tri- 
Way received significantly more than $4,000 per month. 
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E. Gray's Unjust Enrichment Claim Should Not: Have Been Dismissed; Gray 
Introduced Evidence of the Amount That Tri-Way Was Enriched 
unjustenrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied in 
law. Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440,447 (Idaho 2004) 
(citing Peavy). Here, the District Court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, wrongly holding 
"Gray introduced no evidence of the amount Tri-Way was enriched by bringing in two projects." 
(R 11 7). 
Gray clearly introduced evidence that Tri-Way was enriched and was enriched unjustly. 
As indicated, it is undisputed that Gray brought two very profitable projects (with respective 
gross revenues of at least $960,000 and $215,000) to Tri-Way that by far outweighed the $4,000 
per month salary he was paid by Tri-Way. (Exhibit 4 Ex. ( 1 14); (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (81:s-11)). 
Further, the evidence shows that Tri-Way only received this windfall because of promises made 
to Gray. The undisputed evidence that Gray's efforts had significantly enriched Tri-Way 
($966,070 in revenue and $271,792.48 in net profit froin June through September 30, 2004 for 
one project alone) and, evidence all of the parties (Tri-Way included) always intended that Gray 
would get 50% of the net profits but did not compensate him properly. Sufficient facts are in the 
record from which a jury should be allowed to determine whether the Tri-Way Parties were 
unjustly enriched. 
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F. Gray Presented Evidence Supporting His Justifiable Reliance On Tri-Way's 
Promises Of 50% Profit Sharing. In Turn, The District Court Should Not 
Have Dismissed Gray's Claims Based On Fraud, Promissory Estoppel, And 
Equitable Estoppel 
There is evidence of justifiable reliance. Gray's evidence of reliance is based on 
affirmative misstatements of facts as well as fraudulent concealment with the intent to induce 
Gray to begin his employment with Tri-Way. Both are supported by facts in the record and 
provide a basis for denial of the Tri-Way Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding 
fraud, promissory, and equitable estoppel. 
As set forth above, the Tri-Way Parties' attempts to construe the parties' agreement 
regarding profit sharing as still in negotiation are not supported in the facts. Moreover, Gray did 
not, as the Tri-Way Parties contend, acltnowledge that the terms "were never agreed upon by the 
parties." To the contrary, Gray testified that he reached an agreement on the compensation terms 
at the May 21, 2004 Meeting. To the extent that the Tri-Way Parties made representations of 
fact regarding Gray's salary and/or profit sharing compensation without disclosing to Gray that 
they had no intention of honoring that agreement, the Tri-Way Parties have acted fraudulently 
and have induced reliance. Similarly, to the extent the Tri-Way Parties fraudulently concealed 
their intention not to honor the agreement according to the terms that they had reached with Gray 
in order to induce him to begin working for Tri-Way, they have acted fraudulently. Both sets of 
facts are supported by the record in this case. 
Further, Gray has introduced facts that support a claim for equitable estoppel and 
promissory estoppel on the basis that the Tri-Way Parties falsely represented or concealed 
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material facts from Gray regarding their intention to honor the terms of the parties' agreement 
regarding salary and prolit sharing compensation. Gray had no way of knowing that the Tri-Way 
Parties had no intention of honoring their agreement with Gray until after Gray had already left 
Albertsons and started work at Tri-Way. Additionally, as indicated, the Tri-Way Parties made 
the representations affirming the compensation terms and concealed their true intentions with the 
intent that Gray rely on them. Gray did in fact rely on those representations and was damaged. 
Consequently, given the disputed and undisputed facts in the record, summary judgment on these 
claims is inappropriate. The evidence also supports the reasonableness of Gray's reliance on the 
Tri-Way Parties promises and his impression that the paities had reached a bargain on the terms 
of his employment, including the amount of his profit sharing compensation. (Exhibit 4 (1112- 
14, 18)' One important such fact is that the Tri-Way Parties never told Gray that they had 
rejected the terms of his employment agreement. Also of importance is the fact that the Tri-Way 
Parties allowed Gray to begin working and only later attempted to renegotiate the terms of 
Gray's agreement with Tri-Way. (See, e.g., Exhibit 4 (1 16)). 
G. Constructive Fraud 
The District Court did not expressly address Gray's claim for constructive fraud. (R 102- 
122). Accordingly, the District Court's intentions and basis for dismissal (assuming the 
dismissal was done knowingly) are unclear. The Tri-Way Parties contend that the record does 
not support the requisite relationship. 
While disputing a specific agreement, Allard and Gary Peterson admit that they never told Gray that he would not 
receive any profit sharing For his efforts on behalf of Tri-Way. (Exhibit 8, Ex. 6 (152:l-12). Gary Peterson never 
told Gray "anything like" Tri-Way is "never going to give you 50% of the profits." (Exhibit 2, Ex. B (213:7-12)). 
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"An action in constructive fraud exists when there has been a breach of a duty arising 
from a relationship of trust and confidence, as in a fiduciary duty." Hines v. Hines, 129 ldaho 
847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (Idaho 1997) (reversing District Court's denial of motion to amend to 
include constructive fraud claim, citing McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760, 
762 (1960). "In its generic sense constructive fiaud comprises all acts, omissions and 
concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence and resulting in 
damage to another. Constructive fraud usually arises from a breach of duty where a relationship 
of trust and confidence exists; such relationship may be said to exist whenever trust or 
confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another." McGhee, 82 Idaho 
at 371, 353 P.2d at 762. 
Gray had a longstanding friendship with Allard. Moreover, all parties agree, the 
arrangement at issue was one of profit sharing. Further, Gray began working at Tri-Way based 
upon representations that any subsequent written agreement would accord with the verbal 
agreements reached at the May 21 Meeting. Once the parties reached an agreement in May 2004 
regarding the terms of Gray's employment, Gray placed Tri-Way in a position of trust, believing 
that they would carry out their obligations under those agreements and not take steps directly 
contrary to his interests. Given the nature of the relationship between the parties and the fact of 
Gray's trust in the Tri-Way Parties to protect his interests, a relationship of trust and confidence 
is appropriate in this case. Summary judgment should have been denied, 
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111. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Gray requests that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment for the Tri-Way Parties and overturn the award of attorneys fees as the 
prevailing parties. Substantial issues of fact exist which compel allowing this dispute to proceed 
to trial. 
DATED this 29th day of August, 2008. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Erik F. stiddam, of the firm 
Attorneys for PlaintiffIAppellant Robed Gray 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Jason G. Murray, Esq. 
MOFFATT HOMAS BARRETT ROCK 
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101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
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Boise, Idaho 83701-0829 
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